Bottom line up front (BLUF)
•─ whether civilizations have a life cycle and follow a similar pattern of change.
•─ these civilizations tend to pass through a common pattern of experience.
•─ In more than a dozen other civilizations the Age of expansion was followed by an Age of crisis, and this, in turn, by a period of Universal empire in which a single political unit ruled the whole extent of the civilization. Western civilization, on the contrary, did not pass from the Age of crisis to the Age of universal empire, but instead was able to reform itself and entered upon a new period of expansion. Moreover, Western civilization did this not once, but several times. It was this ability to reform or reorganize itself again and again which made Western civilization the dominant factor in the world at the beginning of the 20th century.
•─ Of these twelve dead or dying cultures, six have been destroyed by Europeans bearing the culture of Western Civilization.
Please read the first 30 pages of Tragedy and hope movement,
go to en.wikipedia.org page on Tragedy and hope, and look for the resource near the bottom the page that should get you to the pdf file for Tragedy and hope. or
bing or google Tragedy and hope, Carroll Quigley
and find Tragedy_and_Hope.pdf that way
most web browser has an embedded pdf file reader,
Simply use the web browser to open the pdf file, treating it like a web page.
If you are time constrainted, you can read one page per day for 30 days, so within one month, you would have the coverage.
Why?
Tragedy and hope is written by Carroll Quigley
when Bill Clinton (the former POTUS, president of the united states) was in college, he said, he took this class, given by Prof. Carroll Quigley, and this is the TEXT they used in the class.
I read a thing or a Bill Clinton interview and that's how I learned about Tragedy and Hope, written by Carroll Quigley. What ever it was, or what ever it is, former POTUS Clinton gave a high mark and great review of Prof. Carroll Quigley and the TEXT, Tragedy and Hope. I am sure you can bing (google, duckduckgo, dogpile, microsoft copilot), Bill Clinton took a class from prof. Carroll Quigley use text tragedy and hope interview, and see what you come up with.
If you do not know Bill Clinton, or you do not like Bill Clinton, or you like Bill Clinton, or you like Hillary; never mind, if you have not read this, then I want you to read it. 30 pages is not too much to ask. If you like the writing and the subject, you can read the rest at your own choosing; if you do read it [Tragedy and Hope] like I ask, then you lost time reading 30 pages of something you are not interested in. At least now, you know, this TEXT exist, and there is a guy, Carroll Quigley who wrote it.
This is the movement. Read 30 pages of Tragedy and Hope.
Tragedy and hope : a history of the world in our time, written by Carroll Quigley, first published in 1966.
p.3
, men have been puzzling over the problem whether civilizations have a life cycle and follow a similar pattern of change.
From this discussion has emerged a fairly general agreement that men live in separately organized societies, each with its own distinct culture, that some of these societies,
pp.3─4
; and that these civilizations tend to pass through a common pattern of experience.
From these studies it would seem that civilizations pass through a process of evolution which can be analyzed briefly as follows:
each civilization is born into some inexplicable fashion and,
after a slow start,
enters a period of vigorous expansion,
increasing its size and power,
both internally and at the expense of its neighbors,
until gradually a crisis of organization appears.
When this crisis has passed and the civilization has been reorganized, it seems somewhat different. Its vigor and morale have weakened. It becomes stabilized and eventually stagnant. After a Golden Age of peace and prosperity, internal crises again arise. At this point there appears, for the first time, a moral and physical weakness which raises, also for the first time, questions about the civilization's ability to defend itself against external enemies. Racked by internal struggles of a social and constitutional character, weakened by loss of faith in its older ideologies and by the challenge of newer ideas incompatible with its past nature, the civilization grows steadily weaker until it is submerged by outside enemies and eventually disappears.
p.4
In more than a dozen other civilizations the Age of expansion was followed by an Age of crisis, and this, in turn, by a period of Universal empire in which a single political unit ruled the whole extent of the civilization. Western civilization, on the contrary, did not pass from the Age of crisis to the Age of universal empire, but instead was able to reform itself and entered upon a new period of expansion. Moreover, Western civilization did this not once, but several times. It was this ability to reform or reorganize itself again and again which made Western civilization the dominant factor in the world at the beginning of the 20th century.
p.4
The age of expansion is generally marked by four kinds of expansion:
(1) of population,
(2) of geographic area,
(3) of production, and
(4) of knowledge.
p.4
an older core area (which had existed as part of the civilization even before the period of expansion) and
a newer peripheral area (which became part of the civilzation only in the period of expansion and later).
If we wish, we can make, ..., a third, semiperipheral area between the core area and the fully peripheral area.
Mesopotamian Civilization (6000 B.c-300 B.C.)
Cretan Civilization (3500 B.C.-I 100 B.C.)
Canaanite Civilization (2200 B.C.-IOO B.C.)
Western Civilization (A.D. 400 to some time in the future)
p.5
Another way of saying this is that the core passes from the Age of expansion to the Age of conflict before the periphery does.
Eventually, in most civilizations the rate of expansion begins to decline everywhere.
p.5
This latter [Age of conflict] is the most complex, most interesting, and most critical of all the periods of the life cycle of a civilization.
It is marked by four chief characteristics:
(a) it is a period of declining rate of expansion;
(b) it is a period of growing tensions and class conflicts;
(c) it is a period of increasingly frequent and increasingly violent imperialist cars; and
(d) it is a period of growing irrationality, pessimism, superstitions, and other worldliness. All these phenomena appear in the core area of a civilization before they appear in more peripheral portions of the society.
p.5
Social classes and political units within the civilzation try to compensate for the slowing of expansion through normal growth by the use of violence against other social classes or against other political units. From this come class struggles and imperialist wars. The outcomes of these struggles within the civilization are not of vital significance for the future of the civilization itself.
p.6
Indeed, the class struggles and imperialist wars of the Age of conflict will probably serve to increase the speed of the civilization's decline because they dissipate capital and divert wealth and energies from productive to nonproductive activities.
Thus, Mesopotamia's core was conquered by semi-peripheral Babylonia about 1700 B.C., while the whole of Mesopotamian civilization was conquered by more peripheral Assyria about 725 B.C. (replaced by fully peripheral Persia about 525 B.C.).
Mayan Civilization (1000 B . C - A.D. 1550)
Andean Civilization (1500 B.C.-A.D. 1600)
Canaanite Civilization (2200 B.C.-146 B.C.)
Sinic civilization
valley of the Yellow river
Chin and Han empires
Ural-Altaic invaders
(a) Chinese Civilization, which began about A.D. 400, culminated in the Manchu Empire after 1644, and was disrupted by European invaders in the period 1700-1930, and
(b) Japanese Civilization, which began about the time of Christ, culminated in the Tokugawa Empire after 1600, and may have been completely disrupted
by invaders from Western Civilization in the century following 1853.
Indie Civilization, which began about 3500 B.C., was destroyed by Aryan invaders about 1700 B.C Hindu Civilization, which emerged from Indie Civilization about 1700 B.C., culminated in the Mogul Empire and was destroyed by invaders from Western Civilization in the period 1500-1900.
Islamic Civilization, which began about A.D. 500, culminated in the Ottoman Empire in the period 1300-1600 and has been in the process of being destroyed by invaders from Western Civilization since about 1750.
Of these twelve dead or dying cultures, six have been destroyed by Europeans bearing the culture of Western Civilization. When we consider the untold numbers of other societies, simpler than civilizations, which Western Civilization has destroyed or is now destroying, societies such as the Hottentots, the Iroquois, the Tasmanians, the Navahos, the Caribs, and countless others, the full frightening power of Western Civilization becomes obvious.
p.7
see bottom half of page seven
Civilization Its dates Universal empire Final invasions their dates
p.8
By creating a new culture from the various elements offered from the barbarian tribes, the Roman world, the Saracen world, and above all the Jewish world (Christianity), Western Civilization became a new societv.
p.9
This new Age of Expansion, frequently called the period of commercial capitalism, lasted from about 1440 to about 1680.
p.9
The real impetus
to economic expansion during the period came from efforts to obtain
profits by the interchange of goods, especially semiluxury or luxury
goods, over long distances.
In time, this system of commercial capitalism became petrified into a structure of vested interests in which profits were sought by imposing restrictions on the production or interchange of goods rather than by encouraging these activities.
This new vested-interest structure, usually called mercantilism, became such a burden on economic activities that the rate of expansion of economic life declined and even gave rise to a period of economic decline in the decades immediately following 1690.
p.10
The social organization which was at the center of this new development might be called "industrial capitalism."
"monopoly capitalism."
Leaving aside this hypothetical future, it would appear
thus that Western Civilization, in approximately fifteen hundred years,
has passed through eight periods, thus:
1. Mixture, 350-700
2. Gestation, 700-970
3A. First Expansion, 970-1270
4A. First Conflict, 1270-1440
Core Empire: England, 1420
3B. Second Expansion, 1440-1690
4B. Second Conflict, 1690-1815
Core Empire: France, 1810
3C. Third Expansion, 1770-1929
4C. Third Conflict, 1893-
Core Empire: Germany, 1942
p.11
In such a situation Western Civilization played a role as invader similar to that played by the Germanic tribes in Classical Civilization,
by the Dorians in Cretan Civilization,
by the Greeks in Mesopotamian or Egyptian Civilization,
by the Romans in Canaanite Civilization, or
by the Ayrans in Indie Civilization.
The Westerners who burst in upon
the Aztecs in 1519, on
the Incas in 1534 on
the Mogul Empire in the eighteenth century, on
the Manchu empire after 1790, on
the Ottoman Empire after 1774, and on
the Tokugawa Empire after 1853 were performing the same role as the
Visigoths and the other barbarian tribes to the Roman Empire after 377.
p.12
Much of the world's history in the twentieth century has arisen from the interactions of these three factors (the continental heartland of Russian power, the shattered cultures of the Buffer Fringe of Asia, and the oceanic powers of Western Civilization).
p.15
The most important parts of Western technology can be listed under
four headings:
1. Ability to kill: development of weapons
2. Ability to preserve life: development of sanitation and medical
services
3. Ability to produce both food and industrial goods
4. Improvements in transportation and communications
p.17
After 1825 both were greatly improved by the
growth of a network of railroads, while communications were speeded by
the use of the telegraph (after 1837) and the cable (after 1850). This
"conquest of distance" was unbelievably accelerated in the twentieth
century by the use of internal-combustion engines in automobiles, air-
craft, and ships and by the advent of telephones and radio communica-
tions. The chief result of this tremendous speeding up of communica-
tions and transportation was that all parts of the world were brought
closer together, and the impact of European culture on the non-European
world was greatly intensified. This impact was made even more over-
whelming by the fact that the Transportation Revolution spread outward
from Europe extremely rapidly, diffusing almost as rapidly as the spread
of European weapons,' somewhat more rapidly than the spread of Euro-
pean sanitation and medical services, and much more rapidly than the
spread of European industrialism, European agricultural techniques, or
European ideology. As we shall see in a moment, many of the problems
which the world faced at the middle of the twentieth century were rooted
in the fact that these different aspects of the European way of life spread
outward into the non-European world at such different speeds that the
non-European world obtained them in an entirely different order from that
in which Europe had obtained them.
Transportation Revolution spread outward from Europe extremely rapidly, diffusing almost as rapidly as the spread
of
European weapons,' somewhat more rapidly than the spread of
European sanitation and medical services, and much more rapidly than the
spread of
European industrialism,
European agricultural techniques, or
European ideology.
As we shall see in a moment, many of the problems
which the world faced at the middle of the twentieth century were rooted
in the fact that these different aspects of the European way of life spread
outward into the non-European world at such different speeds that the
non-European world obtained them in an entirely different order from that
in which Europe had obtained them.
p.18
Another important example of this situation can be seen in the fact that
in Europe the Agricultural Revolution began before the Industrial Revo-
lution. Because of this, Europe was able to increase its output of food
and thus the supply of labor necessary for industrialization. But in the
non-European world (except North America) the effort to industrialize
generally began before there had been any notable success in obtaining
a more productive agricultural system. As a result, the increased supply
of food (and thus of labor) needed for the growth of industrial cities in
the non-European world has generally been obtained, not from increased
output of food so much as from a reduction of the peasants' share of the
food produced.
[[ see potatoe famine: Irish (Y), Dutch, and Sweddish famine ?? and ]]
[[ Irish migration to the North American continent (u.s.) ]]
Russia, Soviet union, China
In the Soviet Union, especially, the high speed of indus-
trialization in the period 1926-1940 was achieved by a merciless oppres-
sion of the rural community in which millions of peasants lost their lives.
The effort to copy this Soviet method in Communist China in the 1950's
brought that area to the verge of disaster.
p.18
differential diffusion rates : of two developments
the difference between :
the spread of the food-producing revolution and
the spread of the revolution in sanitation and medical services.
The most important example of such differential diffusion rates of two
European developments appears in the difference between the spread
of the food-producing revolution and the spread of the revolution in
sanitation and medical services. This difference became of such world-
shaking consequences by the middle of the twentieth century that we
must spend considerable time examining it.
[[ increased in food production => population growth => housing => population density => need for sanitation; population growth => jobs (what is job, employment, career and profession?); increased in food production without the sanitation and medical services usually result in population growth and deaths; ... ]]
p.18
In Europe the Agricultural Revolution which served to increase the
supply of food began at least fifty years before the beginnings of the
revolution in sanitation and medical services which decreased the num-
ber of deaths and thus increased the number of the population. The two
dates for these two beginnings might be put roughly at 1725 and 1775.
p.19
When the population reached a point where Europe itself could no longer feed its own people (say about 1850),
the outlying areas of the European and non-European worlds were so
eager to' be industrialized (or to obtain railroads) that Europe was able
to obtain non-European food in exchange for European industrial products. This sequence of events was a very happy combination for Europe.
p.19
the demographic explosion which began in northwestern Europe
p.19
Most stable and primitive societies, such as the American Indians before
149; or medieval Europe, have no great population problem because the
birthrate is balanced by the death rate.
pp.19─20
Most stable and primitive societies, such as the American Indians before
149; or medieval Europe, have no great population problem because the
birthrate is balanced by the death rate. In such societies both of these
are high, the population is stable, and the major portion of that population
is young (below eighteen years of age). This kind of society (frequently
called Population Type A) is what existed in Europe in the medieval pe-
riod (say about 1400) or even in part of the early modern period (say
about 1700). As a result of the increased supply of food in Europe after
1725, and of men's increased ability to save lives because of advances in
sanitation and medicine after 1775, the death rate began to fall, the birthrate remained high, the population began to increase, and the number of older persons in the society increased. This gave rise to what we have
called the demographic explosion (or Population Type B). As a result
of it, the population of Europe (beginning in western Europe) increased
in the nineteenth century, and the major portion of that population was
in the prime of life (ages eighteen to forty-five), the arms-bearing years
for men and the childoearing years for women.
At this point the demographic cycle of an expanding population goes
into a third stage (Population Type C) in which the birthrate also begins
to fall. The reasons for this fall in the birthrate have never been explained in a satisfactory way, but, as a consequence of it, there appears a new demographic condition marked by a falling birthrate, a low death rate, and a stabilizing and aging population whose major part is in the mature years from thirty to sixty. As the population gets older because of the decrease in births and the increase in expectation of life, a larger and larger part of the population has passed the years of bearing children
or bearing arms. This causes the birthrate to decline even more rapidly,
and eventually gives a population so old that the death rate begins to rise
again because of the great increase in deaths from old age or from the
casualties of inevitable senility. Accordingly, the society passes into a
fourth stage of the demographic cycle (Population Type D). This stage
is marked bv a declining birthrate, a rising death rate, a decreasing popu-
lation, and a population in which the major part is over fifty years of age.
It must be confessed that the nature of the fourth stage of this demo-
graphic cycle is based on theoretical considerations rather than on em-
pirical observation, because even western Europe, where the cycle is
most advanced, has not yet reached this fourth stage. However, it seems
quite likelv that it will pass into such a stage by the year 2000, and
already the increasing number of older persons has given rise to new
problems and to a new science called geriatrics both in western Europe
and in the eastern United States.
p.21
This shows that there has been a sequence, at intervals of about fifty
years, of four successive population pressures which might be designated
with the following names:
Anglo-French pressure, about 1850
Germanic-Italian pressure, about 1900
Slavic pressure, about 1950
Asiatic pressure, about 2000
This diffusion of pressure outward from the western European core of
Western Civilization can contribute a great deal toward a richer understanding of the period 1850-2000.
It helps to explain
the Anglo-French rivalry about 1850,
the Anglo-French alliance based on fear of Germany after 1900,
the free-world alliance based on fear of Soviet Russia after
1950, and
the danger to both Western Civilization and Soviet Civilization from Asiatic pressure by 2000.
p.22
At that time the development of weapons
had reached a point where governments could not get weapons which
were much more effective than those which private individuals could
get. Moreover, private individuals could obtain good weapons because
they had a high enough standard of living to afford it (as a result of the
Agricultural Revolution) and such weapons were cheap (as a result of
the Industrial Revolution). By 1930 (and even more by 1950) the
development of weapons had advanced to the point where governments
could obtain more effective weapons (dive-bombers, armored cars,
flamethrowers, poisonous gases, and such) than private individuals.
p.27
This change has arisen from a series of shattering experiences which have profoundly disturbed patterns of behavior and of belief, of social organizations and human hopes. Of these shattering experiences the chief were the trauma of the First world war, the long-drawn-out agony of the world depression, and the unprecedented violence of destruction of the Second world war.
p.27
To a people who believed in the innate goodness of man, in inevitable progress, in the community of interests, and in evil as merely the absence of good, the First world war, with its millions of persons dead and its billions of dollars wasted, was a blow to terrible as to be beyond human ability to comprehend.
p.27
1919─1929
the stock market crash, the world depression, the world financial crisis, and the clamor of rearmmament and aggression.
p.28
human nature is, if not innately bad, at least capable of being very evil. Left to himself, it seems today, man falls very easily to the level of the jungle or even lower, and this result can be prevented only by training and the coercive power of society. Thus, man is capable of great evil, but society can prevent this.
p.28
At the same time the view that evil is merely the absence of good has been replaced with the idea that evil is a very positive force which must be resisted and overcome. The horrors of Hitler's concentration camps and of Stalin's slave-labor units are chiefly responsible for this change.
p.28
The belief that human abilities are innate and should be left free from social duress in order to display themselves has been replaced by the idea that human abilities are the result of social training and must be directed to socially acceptable ends.
p.28
Thus liberaism and laissez-faire are to be replaced, apparently, by social discipline and planning.
p.30
Among these less sturdy traits of western Europe's great century we might mention liberalism, democracy, the parliamentary system, optimism, and the belief in inevitable progress. These were, we might say, flowers of such delicate nature that they could not survive any extended period of stormy weather. That the 20th century subjected them to long periods of very stormy weather is clear when we consider that it brought a world economic depression sandwiched between two world wars.
••••••••
Tragedy and hope : a history of the world in our time, written by Carroll Quigley, first published in 1966.
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πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ,ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα πόλλ' οἶδ' ἀλώπηξ,ἀλλ' ἐχῖνος ἓν μέγα
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